Does Ability Tracking Exacerbate the Role of Family Background for Student's Test Scores? by Waldinger, Fabian
Does Ability Tracking Exacerbate the Role of Family
Background for StudentsTest Scores?
Fabian Waldinger (LSE & CEP)
February 16, 2007
Abstract
This study investigates whether ability tracking exacerbates the role of parental
background for studentseducational test scores. Using microdata from di¤erent edu-
cational studies, PISA, PIRLS and TIMSS, this paper exploits the cross-country vari-
ation in tracking policies to identify the e¤ect of tracking. Controlling for unobserved
country level variables using di¤erence-in-di¤erences, I nd that family background is
more important in early tracking countries but that the importance of family back-
ground does not increase after actual tracking has taken place. This suggests that
tracking does not augment the role of family background for students test scores.
Factors other than tracking are more likely to be responsible for the fact that family
background is more important in early tracking countries. This result runs contrary
to the ndings of the current literature. In support of my ndings, I show that the
results of the current literature are not robust to slight changes in specication.
1 Introduction
The results from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) have trig-
gered a serious debate about the functioning of education systems. An important nding of
PISA is the widely varying inuence of a students family background on her educational
achievement across di¤erent countries. There are a number of possible explanations for
this phenomenon, with features of the schooling system being widely seen as key factors.
A frequently discussed feature is ability tracking of students. Ability tracking, or simply
tracking, means placing students into di¤erent school tracks according to some measure of
I thank Holger Breinlich, Rocco Macchiavello, Steve Machin, Ralph Ossa, Matthias Parey, Giacomo
Rodano, Justin Smith and especially Steve Pischke for very helpful discussions and comments. I also thank
seminar participants at the LSE and the CEPR conference on the Economics of Education in Padua for
helpful suggestions.
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their ability. For the purposes of this paper I refer to tracking as a policy which places stu-
dents of di¤erent abilities in di¤erent schools.1 In practice, the use of tracking varies greatly
across countries; some educate all children in the same type of school until high-school grad-
uation while others separate children as soon as they reach the age of 10. Di¤erences in
tracking policies and the widely varying impact of family background on educational out-
comes across di¤erent countries has lead politicians but also people involved in educational
research to argue that tracking has a causal impact on the importance of family background
for educational achievement.
One of the main theoretical arguments is that children develop gradually and ability
levels are di¢ cult to observe at early ages. In a system that tracks students early, children
from higher socioeconomic backgrounds may be more likely to be placed in academic tracks
for reasons independent of their true ability. The reasoning behind this argument is that
parents from higher socioeconomic backgrounds are more aware of the importance of sending
their children to the more academic school tracks.
Also in untracked schooling systems do parents from higher socioeconomic backgrounds
have the possibility to ensure a better education for their children; albeit through di¤erent
channels: parents may move closer to a better school or place their children in a private
school. Whether tracking actually exacerbates the importance of parental background for
educational achievement is ultimately an empirical question.
The ndings of PISA and other cross-country educational studies show a positive cor-
relation between tracking and the importance of the family background for studentstest
scores. Nonetheless, I argue in this paper that it may be overhasty to interpret this cor-
relation as a causal e¤ect. In fact, I use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences methodology to show
that tracking does not exacerbate the importance of parental background for studentstest
scores once controls for pre-tracking di¤erences are added to the econometric specication.
I use cross-country di¤erences in tracking policies to identify the impact of tracking on
the importance of family background for studentstest scores using data from three large
international educational studies: PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment),
PIRLS (Progress in International Reading Literacy Study), and TIMSS (Third International
Mathematics and Science Study).
The following two graphs illustrate the e¤ect I estimate in this paper. For Figure 1, I rst
regressed post-tracking reading test scores on the three parental background characteristics
shown on the vertical axes of the graphs, separately for each country. I then plot each
countrys coe¢ cient against its tracking grade for those background characteristics.2
1Placing students of di¤erent abilities into di¤erent classes within a school type is less strong form of
tracking. In this paper, however, I do not analyze this within-school tracking.
2The estimating equation is: TestScore = 1+ 2ParentBackground+ 3StudentCharacteristics+ :
The 2 coe¢ cient for each country is then plotted on the vertical axis of each graph.
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Figure 1: Family Background and Tracking Grade PISA 2003 (Grades 9/10)
Figure 1 shows clearly that background has a higher impact on reading test scores in
early tracking countries for all parental background measures. In Figure 2 I use the same
methodology as for Figure 1 but replacing PISA reading scores with TIMSS mathematics
scores. This gure shows that the same relationship exists for mathematics.
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Figure 2: Family Background and Tracking Grade TIMSS 1995 (Grades 7/8)
The visual evidence from Figures 1 and 2 clearly indicate that family background is more
important for secondary school studentstest scores in early tracking countries. The fact
that similar relationships exist for di¤erent studies (PISA and TIMSS, which are carried out
by di¤erent organizations and use di¤erent methodologies) hints that this relationship is not
a random feature of any particular dataset. The graphs do not, however, provide evidence
about whether tracking has a causal impact on the importance of parental background on
students test scores. It may well be the case that there exist unobserved country-level
factors which a¤ect the impact of parental background on educational test scores. If these
unobserved factors are correlated with a countrys tracking regime, estimates using a simple
cross-section of students would be biased.
A simple way to investigate the role of unobserved factors is to repeat the graphical
analysis from Figures 1 and 2 using tests administered to students before tracking has taken
place in any of the countries in the sample. In the absence of anticipation e¤ects there
should be no relationship between the tracking regime (which a¤ects students after taking
the test) and the importance of the studentsparental background. For reading, I use data
from the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), which tested primary
school students in grade 4. It is important to note, that none of the countries in the sample
tracks students before the end of grade 4. Applying the same techniques used in the previous
graphs, Figure 3 shows the relationship between the importance of family background for
4
test scores and the tracking grade (which will eventually a¤ect students) for this new data.
Figure 4 then repeats this exercise with the grades 3 and 4 mathematics data from TIMSS.3
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Figure 3: Family Background and Tracking Grade PIRLS 2001 (Grade 4)
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Figure 4: Family Background and Tracking Grade TIMSS 1995 (Grades 3/4)
3Unfortunately, the TIMSS data for the primary school grades does not include parental education.
Therefore, I omit this variable from the graphical analysis for mathematics test scores of primary school
students.
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Apart from the number of books variable for the reading test score, there is a negative
relationship between the importance of parental background and the tracking regime even
before tracking has taken place in any country. This suggests that there are unobserved fac-
tors a¤ecting the impact of parental background that are correlated with a countrys tracking
regime. Investigating the e¤ect of tracking therefore requires an identication strategy that
controls for these pre-existing di¤erences across early and late tracking countries. To ad-
dress this problem, I use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DiD) methodology. The DiD results
presented below indicate that, once the "pre-tracking" level of the family background e¤ect
on childrens test scores is controlled for, tracking no longer a¤ects the impact of family
background.4
These results cast serious doubt on the conclusions of a number of concurrent papers,
such as Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) or Ammermueller (2005), which nd that track-
ing increases educational inequality and exacerbates the e¤ect of family background for
studentstest scores. I show, however, that slight changes in tracking variables, samples, or
specications renders the results of the relevant cross-country studies insignicant.
Understanding whether ability tracking intensies the impact of parental background is
important not only for educational researchers but also for policy makers. Countries that
would like to increase educational equity should delay tracking if it increases the impor-
tance of family background for educational outcomes. Delaying the tracking age, which is
often suggested as a way to reduce the link between parental background and educational
outcomes, has been an important aspect of school reform in a number of di¤erent countries.
Since the 1960s, the UK, some Scandinavian countries, Spain, and most recently Poland
delayed their tracking age. If tracking, however, does not intensify the importance of family
background, any such move would induce large costs without benet. Careful studies on
the e¤ect of tracking are therefore needed to understand its e¤ect on educational inequality.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the
relevant literature. Section 3 presents the identication strategy used to identify the causal
e¤ect of tracking. Section 4 discusses the data coming from a number of cross-country school
studies: PIRLS, PISA and TIMSS. Section 5 presents the main regression results for reading
and mathematics test scores separately. Section 6 probes the sensitivity of my ndings and
Section 7 discusses these results and concludes.
2 Previous Research
There are a number of studies that investigate the e¤ect of tracking on educational equity.
I classify these studies into three broad categories: those using educational reforms of the
tracking grade within a country, those using existing within country variation in tracking,
4It is worthy to note that this method does not control for anticipation e¤ects of parents or students
which may a¤ect the importance of family background already before tracking has taken place.
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and those using cross-country di¤erences in tracking regimes to identify the e¤ect of tracking.
A widely studied educational reform is the abolishment of ability tracking in Britain
during the 1960s and 1970s (see for example Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2005)). In spite
of the attention paid to this reform, Pischke and Manning (2006) show that no existing
study has successfully solved selection e¤ects into tracked and untracked schools during the
transition period from a selective to a comprehensive schooling system.
Another strand of the literature uses existing within-country variation in tracking to
identify its e¤ect on educational equity. Using data mostly from the United States, the
general nding is that there are at most small e¤ects of tracking on educational equity.5
Papers exploiting within-country variation of tracking, however, su¤er from three main
problems. First, the tracking measure is based on teachers, headteachers or students
judgements about whether a school tracks students. It is not clear whether these measures
for tracking are treated consistently across schools. A second problem with these studies
is that unobserved factors that a¤ect test scores (student motivation, for example) could
be correlated with attending a tracked or an untracked school, producing biased results. A
third problem is that tracking regimes have little variation within a country; there is much
more variation in tracking regimes across di¤erent countries.
These problems have led a number of researchers to use cross-country variation in track-
ing to identify the e¤ect of tracking. The reasoning is that data from di¤erent schooling
systems may alleviate the problem of having a noisy tracking measure. Furthermore, one
may deal with the second problem stated above, as it is unlikely that individual student
unobservables are correlated with a country level measure for tracking. These advantages,
however, come at the expense of another omitted variable bias problem. It could be the case
that the cross-country variation in tracking is correlated with country-level unobservables,
which inuence test scores.
The increasing availability of data with internationally comparable test scores has trig-
gered research on the e¤ect of tracking on studentstest scores in the very recent past.6
Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) carry out an analysis which uses cross-country variation
in tracking to identify its e¤ect on the within-country variance of educational test scores.
They address the problem of unobserved country level variables by using a DiD approach.
Their ndings "provide (...) reasonably strong support for the disequalizing e¤ects of early
tracking." One of the main problems of their study, however, is the use of country-level
data of the dispersion of test scores, since this leads to extremely small sample sizes. Fur-
thermore, I show below that using a di¤erent measure for the tracking regime renders their
results insignicant. Their results are further weakened by restricting their sample to OECD
countries, only.
5See Betts and Shkolnik (1998), Rees, Brewer and Argys (2000) and Figlio and Page (2000) for studies
which try to control for sorting of students across tracked and untracked schools.
6Brunello and Checchi (2006) investigate the e¤ect of tracking for outcomes later in life and nd that
tracking does not a¤ect the importance of family background for reading literacy of adults. They nd,
however, that tracking exacerbates the e¤ect of parental background for wages later in life.
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There are two recent studies which are more closely related to the research presented
here, as they are trying to investigate whether tracking a¤ects the impact of the family
background on studentstest scores. Schuetz, Ursprung, and Woessmann (2005) interact a
measure for a countrys tracking system with the students family background to see whether
tracking changes the impact of parental background for educational achievement. Using data
on secondary school students tested in TIMSS they nd that "the family-background e¤ect
is larger...the earlier a country tracks its students into di¤erent school types by ability."
They try to control for confounding country-level factors by including some controls for
other institutional features of the education system. It is virtually impossible, however, to
control for all unobserved country level factors that are correlated with the tracking measure
and a¤ect the importance of parental background on studentstest scores. Any unobserved
factor may bias the results, casting doubt on the ndings of studies that do not control for
pre-tracking di¤erences in the importance of parental background for studentstest scores.
The second paper looking explicitly at the importance of the socioeconomic background is
a study by Ammermueller (2005). Using PISA 2000 and PIRLS data, he nds that "(T)he
social origin of students ... increases its e¤ect on student performance in countries with
a di¤erentiated schooling system...". Ammermuellers tracking measure uses the number
of tracks in a schooling system. This measure does not capture the di¤erential timing of
tracking across di¤erent countries, which should have an impact on the inuence of tracking.
In checking the robustness of his results, I show that using a slightly di¤erent specication
I do not nd an e¤ect of tracking even using Ammermuellers tracking measure.
3 Identication
Like recent research on ability tracking, I exploit the fact that di¤erent countries have
di¤erent tracking policies. I use cross-country variation in tracking to identify the e¤ect of
tracking on the importance of parental background for childrens test scores. One strategy to
investigate whether tracking exacerbates the impact of parental background for educational
achievement would be to estimate a standard education production function adding an
interaction term of the parental background variables with the tracking regime. This is the
approach used by Schuetz, Ursprung, and Woessmann (2005) and Brunello and Checchi
(2006). They estimate an equation similar to equation (1):
(1) Tisc = 1 + 2STisc + 3Fisc + 1(Fisc  ETc) + 4SQsc + 5Cc + "isc
Where T is a test score for individual i in school s and country c. ST is a vector of
individual characteristics of student i in school s and country c. F is a vector of family
characteristics of student i in school s and country c. ET is a dummy variable indicating
whether a country tracks students at an early stage of their student life. SQ is a vector of
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school quality variables of school s in country c. C is a vector of country dummies. is an
error term. The main interest then lies in obtaining consistent estimates of ; the interaction
of the family background measures with the tracking regime. Finding to be positive would
then be evidence that parental background is more important in early tracking countries.
As in most cross-country studies, the major concern is that any country level variable
(in this case the tracking measure) is correlated with unobserved country level variables.
This is not an issue as long as these variables do not a¤ect the importance of parental
background for studentstest scores because the regression includes country xed e¤ects.
It is quite likely, however, that some country level unobservables a¤ect the inuence of
family background on test scores, like for example pre-primary care. The coverage of pre-
primary care may be correlated with the tracking regime. At the same time, pre-primary
care may a¤ect the impact of the family background on studentseducational achievement
and thus biasing the estimates of in equation (1). The graphical analysis presented in the
introduction already indicates that unobserved variables may pose a severe problem in this
context. I showed above that parental background seems to be more important in early
tracking countries even before actual tracking has taken place.
To solve this problem, I use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy, with test scores taken
at two points of a childs educational career. The rst point is in primary school, before
tracking has taken place in any of the countries in the sample. The second is in secondary
school, after tracking has occurred in some countries. I then compare the change between
the early and the late test in the importance of family background in early versus late
tracking countries.
This is a legitimate strategy to control for unobserved country level variables under the
identifying assumption that the unobserved country characteristics do not change between
the primary and secondary school grades.7 In a regression framework this di¤erence-in-
di¤erences methodology is implemented by estimating equation (2).8
(2) Tisct = 1 + 2STisct + 3Fisct + 4SECONDARYt + 5SQsct + 6Cc
+1(Fisct  ETc) + 2(Fisct  SECONDARYt)
+3(Fisct  ETc  SECONDARYt) + "isct
The abbreviations are the same as for equation (1). The subscript t indicates the two
cohorts: primary school students and secondary school cohorts. Compared to the rst spec-
ication this specication now adds the dummy variable SECONDARY, which indicates
that an observation is taken from the late test examining secondary school students. This
variable controls for any systematic di¤erence between the two test scores.9 The main in-
7It is worthy to note that the di¤erences are not taken for the same individual. Therefore, a further
identifying assumption is that the random assignment of the studies ensured that they tested a representative
sample.
8In results not reported here I also allow the student characteristics to vary across the two di¤erent
studies. This does not a¤ect the ndings on 3:
9As both test scores may not have tested the same skills one has to assume that systematic di¤erences
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terest now lies in identifying the coe¢ cient . If turns out to be positive family background
becomes relatively more important in early tracking countries between primary and sec-
ondary school. If was negative family background becomes relatively less important in early
tracking countries after actual tracking has taken place. This model is estimated using the
pooled data from a study testing primary school students and a study testing secondary
school students. To allow for arbitrary correlations of the error term for students within one
country all standard errors are clustered at the country level. The following part describes
the data I use to estimate equation (2).
4 Data
4.1 Data on Test Scores, Student Characteristics, Family Char-
acteristics, and School Quality Variables
The data on test scores, student characteristics and family background originates from the
microdatasets of three school studies. The data on reading skills comes from PISA and
PIRLS, while the data on mathematics comes from TIMSS. I only use data from OECD
countries because I want to compare countries with a similar development of the educational
sector. Table 1 gives an overview of the countries in the di¤erent estimation samples.
Data for the Reading Results
To implement the DiD strategy, I use two reading test scores taken at di¤erent points in
time of the students school career. Firstly, I use test scores from PIRLS 2001, a study
testing students before tracking has occurred in any country. This study was carried out by
the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) in the
year 2001. PIRLS tested students in grade 4 of primary school, before tracking has taken
place in any country of the sample. Each student obtained a test score that was scaled to
have an international mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. In addition to testing
the reading skills of primary school students, the studentsparents were asked to provide
information on the student and on family background characteristics. Every participating
school had to provide information on class sizes and other measures of school quality.
Secondly, I use a test score from a study testing students after tracking occurred in
some countries. For the reading results I use data from PISA in the years 2000 and 2003.
Administered by the OECD, this study evaluated reading skills of 15-year-old students,
usually attending grades 9 or 10 of secondary school. Like PIRLS, the PISA study was scaled
to have an international mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100.10 The information on
in the two tests are uncorrelated with the family background measures and the tracking regime to obtain
consistent estimates of 3:
10The scores obtainable in the database are plausible values, which are not exactly test scores. "They
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the parental background variables and the student characteristics is taken from the student
questionnaire; the information on school quality variables from a questionnaire which had
to be answered by each participating school.
The DiD estimation requires a primary school and a secondary school test score for each
country. Therefore I can only use observations from countries that participated in both
the PISA 2003 and the PIRLS studies in the main specication for reading.11 The second
column of Table 1 lists all countries in this specication. Column 3 lists the countries used
in a robustness check with data from PIRLS and PISA 2000.
Data for the Mathematics Results
To estimate the specication for the mathematics results I use data from TIMSS. Carried
out by the IEA, TIMSS 1995 tested mathematics and science skills of two di¤erent age
cohorts (one cohort of primary school students and one of secondary school students) across
di¤erent countries. I use the test results of the primary school cohort (attending grades 3 or
4) as an early test score before tracking has occurred in any of the participating countries.
TIMSS also tested the mathematics skills of secondary school students attending grades 7
and 8, which I use as the later test score after which tracking has taken place in the early
tracking countries. Again, I complement the data on test scores with data from student
questionnaires and from the answers to the school questionnaires. The countries in this
sample are shown in column 4 of Table 1.
In 1999 the primary cohort was retested when they were in grades 7 or 8. As a robustness
check for the mathematics results, I combine the TIMSS data from grades 3/4 of 1995 and
grades 7/8 from 1999 as can be seen from the last column of Table 1.
Parental Background Variables Used for Estimation Purposes
For my estimation I rely on the parental background data available in the above datasets.
An important parental background factor for childrens educational attainment is parental
education. More educated parents may be better informed about good parenting practices
and may create a home environment, which stimulates the learning of their children. In the
tables reported below, I use highest parental education, which is measured as the years or
education of the parent with more education. To save space I do not report the specications
where I use fathers and mothers education separately. The results are very similar and do
not a¤ect any of the conclusions drawn below.
are random numbers drawn from the distribution of scores that could be reasonably assigned to each
individual...". Refer to the Technical Reports of PISA for more information.
11In PIRLS England and Scotland are sampled independently. PISA, however, did not sample them
separately. To estimate my results I combine the information of these two countries. Furthermore, in
PIRLS Canada is represented only by the provinces Ontario and Quebec whereas PISA sampled students
from all Canadian provinces. In the reported results for the di¤erence-in-di¤erences specication I include
the combined data on Great Britain and data on Canada. Discarding all observations from these two
countries does only have a small e¤ect on the estimated coe¢ cients and does not a¤ect the signicance or
insignicance of the results.
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Furthermore, I use the number of books in a students home as an alternative measure
for parental background. This variable is frequently used by educational researchers, and
may capture parentsvaluation of education or serve as a proxy for income as books are
consumption goods.12 Finally, I also use a variable indicating whether children speak the
language of school instruction at home as another measure of parental background.
4.2 Data on Tracking
I complement the data on test scores, student characteristics, parental background, and
school quality variables with a country level measure of the tracking regime. Some countries
educate students in the same type of school up to the end of secondary school. Other
countries, however, separate students at early stages of their schooling career. Figure 5
demonstrates the tracking policy of a representative late tracking country, Finland, and a
representative early tracking country, Austria. Whereas Finland does not track students up
to the end of grade nine, students in Austria are placed in di¤erent school tracks after four
years of schooling.
Finland Austria
13 13 Berufs
12 12 bildende
11 General Upper Secondary Vocational US 11 Mittlere
10 10 Schule
9 9 Polytech.
8 8
7 7 Allgemeinbildende Hauptschule
6 Comprehensive School 6 hoehere Schule
5 5
4 4
3 3 Grundschule/ Volkschule
2 2
1 1
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Figure 5: Tracking Policies in Finland and Austria.
I exploit the cross-country variation in tracking policies to identify the e¤ect of tracking
on the importance of family background for studentstest scores. I construct a measure
that indicates after how many grades tracking occurs in each of the countries of my sample.
For the purposes of this paper I dene tracking as educating students in di¤erent types
of schools. This constitutes the strongest form of tracking. Therefore, I do not consider
specialization tracks for certain subjects within a school as tracking. Instead, I focus on a
very strong denition because the e¤ects of tracking are potentially largest for this stark
form of tracking. Furthermore, other denitions would result in a much more noisy tracking
12See Schuetz et al. (2005) for a discussion on using the number of books as a measure for parental
background.
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measure.13 Table 2 gives an overview of the grade after which tracking takes place in the
countries of my sample.
My tracking measure is very similar to the one developed by Hanushek and Woessmann
(2006).14 Their measure captures the age at which tracking takes place. Mine, on the other
hand, relates to the grade after which tracking takes place, which will capture di¤erences
in the school starting age across countries. They classify some countries di¤erently to my
classication, yet a comparison of the two measures indicates that they are quite similar,
which is indicated by the correlation of .81 between the two measures as reported in Table 3.
I show, in fact, that my results hold up when I use the Hanushek and Woessmann tracking
measure.
Alternatively, Ammermueller (2005) uses a tracking measure that counts the number of
school tracks of a country in lower secondary education. This does not capture how many
years a student is exposed to ability tracking, which is a disadvantage as it is likely that
possible e¤ects of tracking are stronger the longer students are educated in di¤erent tracks.
Nevertheless, this measure has an advantage over measures using tracking grade or tracking
age, as it captures how many school tracks exist in each country. By construction, higher
values of the number of school track index indicate more tracking. According to my measure,
however, a higher tracking grade indicates less tracking. Therefore the two measures should
be negatively correlated. Table 3 conrms a negative correlation of the two measures of
-0.75. I show below that my results hold even if I use the number of tracks measure.
To estimate equation (2), I dene an early tracking threshold that indicates whether a
country tracks students early or late. I vary the early tracking threshold between tracking
after grade 4 and tracking after grade 8. I show below that my conclusions do not vary if
I use di¤erent threshold levels for early tracking, indicating that the results are not driven
by an arbitrary choice of the early tracking threshold.
For the countries with later tracking it is sometimes problematic to dene the correct
tracking grade. To overcome this problem, I use a dummy variable early versus late tracking.
This provides a good measure because it is not a¤ected by whether a later tracking country
tracks at grade 9 or grade 10. The measurement problems are much less severe for the
early tracking countries, as most of these have very clear tracking rules. In particular, the
grade 4 to grade 6 thresholds provide measures of tracking, which should be free from major
measurement error. I use these tracking measures to identify the e¤ect of tracking on the
importance of parental background for educational attainment, with results presented in
the following section.
13Some countries exhibit within-country variation of tracking; with some regions tracking students at
di¤erent grades than others. Unfortunately, I cannot distinguish di¤erent regions in the PISA, PIRLS and
TIMSS databases. I therefore assign the grade at which most regions track as the tracking measure for
these countries.
14I thank Ludger Woessmann for kindly providing me with their measure of tracking.
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5 Main Results
5.1 Reading Results
I use data from PIRLS as the early test score (grade 4 students) and data from PISA 2003
(grade 9 or 10 students) as test score of secondary school students to estimate the reading
results. Pooling the data from these two educational studies, I estimate equation (2), and
present results in Table 4.15 The specication used to generate these results takes grade 5
as the early tracking threshold: countries which track at the end of grade 5 or before are
classied as early tracking countries and countries tracking at later stages of a students
career are classied as late tracking countries. I show below that the results are robust to
di¤erent denitions of the early tracking thresholds, such as grade 4, grade 6 or grade 8.
To summarize the results, the coe¢ cients on the student characteristics have the ex-
pected signs and are all highly signicant in all specications. Females do signicantly
better than males in reading, and native pupils do better than immigrants. Not surpris-
ingly, children living with only one of their parents or those who live without their parents
(because they live with other guardians) do signicantly worse than students who live with
both parents.
In column (1) I report the specication that uses highest parental education as the sole
parental background variable. Students whose better-educated parent has one more year of
education score about 6 points better in reading. Interestingly, the importance of parental
education for reading is as important for primary school students as it is for secondary
school students. This is veried by inspecting the very small and insignicant coe¢ cient
on the interaction of parental education with a dummy for the secondary school test. The
positive and signicant interaction of parental education and an indicator for early tracking
countries, on the other hand, indicates that parental education is more important in early
tracking countries. The point estimate shows that an increase of one year of parental
education (for the better educated parent) increases the students reading test score by
about 5 points more in early tracking countries compared to countries with later tracking
grades. This coe¢ cient just indicates that parental education is more important in early
tracking countries. Whether early tracking itself is causing parental education to be more
important or whether other unobserved country level factors, that are correlated with the
tracking regime, play a role has to be investigated in greater detail. To assess this directly,
I include the triple interaction of parental education, an indicator for early tracking, and a
dummy for the secondary school test into equation (2). To make this variable more visible
in the tables it is reported in bold characters. The negative and insignicant coe¢ cient
on this interaction indicates that the importance of parental education for studentstest
scores does not increase between the grades tested in PIRLS and PISA in early tracking
15All the specications reported in the table include school quality variables. Excluding school quality
increases the sample in each country because of fewer missing values and also allows to keep France in the
estimation sample. Results from these regressions are reported in Table A1 of the appendix.
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countries. This suggests that parental background does not become more important after
actual tracking has taken place.
Column (2) of Table 4 reports the results from a specication using the number of books
in the studentshome as the relevant family background variable. The coe¢ cient on the
number of books variable indicates that an increase of 100 books in the students home
increases her test score by 13 points.16 The results on the interaction of the number of
books variable with the secondary school dummy indicates that the number of books in a
students home is more important for secondary school students than for primary school
students. The positive and signicant interaction between the number of books variable
and the indicator for early tracking countries demonstrates that the number of books in
a students home is more important in early tracking countries. The fact that the triple
interaction of the number of books, the indicator for early tracking, and the dummy for
the secondary school test is negative and insignicant shows that the number of books in
a students home do not become more important in early tracking countries after actual
tracking has taken place.
In column (3) I report the specication using an indicator whether the student speaks
the test language with his parents. Speaking the test language at home is a signicant and
important factor of doing well in reading. The interaction of the language indicator with
the secondary school dummy shows that this factor is less important in secondary school
compared to primary school. This is not surprising given that secondary school students have
many more opportunities to speak the language of the country they live in with people other
than their parents than primary school students. The positive and signicant interaction of
speaking the test language and the indicator for early tracking countries shows that speaking
the test language is more important in these countries compared to countries which track
later. Once again, however, the triple interaction of speaking the test language, the early
tracking dummy, and an indicator for the secondary school test is negative and insignicant.
Including all parental background measures in the same specication does not a¤ect the
conclusions drawn before. The results reported in column (4) indicate that the importance
of parental background does not increase in early tracking countries after actual tracking
has taken place. These results therefore cast serious doubt on interpreting the correlation
of tracking and the importance of the family background as causal.
16The number of books variable is coded in 6 categories. I assigned each student the category midpoint as
the number of books at her home. This imposes some restrictions on the functional form of the relationship
between the number of books and test scores. Reestimating this specication by using dummy variables for
each book category gives similar results, namely that the number of books is signicantly more important in
early tracking countries. It does not become more important after actual tracking has taken place, however.
For the sake of clear exposition I only report the results from the continuous number of books measure.
15
5.2 Mathematics Results
To further investigate the role of tracking in intensifying the importance of parental back-
ground, I present results with mathematics scores as the outcome. Unfortunately, TIMSS
1995 did not assess parental education for the students in the primary school cohort. There-
fore, I only report results for the number of books and the language measures of parental
background.17
Table 5 presents the results from estimating equation (2) using the TIMSS data. The
coe¢ cients on the student characteristics all have the expected signs and are similar to the
ones obtained for the reading test score. The main di¤erences are that being native matters
less for mathematics, and that girls do worse in mathematics.
In the rst column I use the number of books in a pupils home as the relevant parental
background measure, which appears to be an important factor a¤ecting student perfor-
mance. Increasing the number of books by 100 increases a students test score by about 15
points. The positive and signicant coe¢ cient on the interaction of the number of books
variable and an indicator for the secondary school cohort indicates that the number of books
are more important in later stages of a students career. The coe¢ cient of interest, the
triple interaction, is negative and marginally signicant, indicating that family background
becomes less important in early tracking countries after tracking has taken place.
The specications reported in column (2) of Table 5 use an indicator for speaking the test
language at home as the relevant parental background measure. Speaking the test language
at home has a strong and signicant e¤ect on mathematics test scores, but seems to be less
important in secondary school. The coe¢ cient on the interaction of the language indicator
and the dummy for the secondary school cohort, however, is not signicant. Speaking the
test language at home seems to be more important in early tracking countries but also the
coe¢ cient on the interaction of the language dummy with the indicator for early tracking
countries is not signicantly di¤erent from 0. The coe¢ cient on the triple interaction again is
not signicantly di¤erent from 0 and has a point estimate which is very close to 0. Speaking
the test language at home does not become more important in early tracking countries after
actual tracking has taken place.
Including both family background measures at the same time does not a¤ect any of the
above conclusions as can be seen be inspecting the results reported in column (3) of Table
5.
The results for mathematics conrm the reading results presented before. There is
clearly no support for the hypothesis that tracking exacerbates the importance of family
background after actual tracking has taken place.
17Again these results are reported for the sample including the school quality controls. The results without
school quality data which result in a larger sample with more countries are reported in Table A2 in the
appendix. As can be seen, the results do not di¤er in any signicant way.
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6 Sensitivity Analysis
These results run contrary to the ndings of the existing studies using cross-country data to
investigate the impact of tracking on educational equality. This section therefore investigates
the robustness of my ndings. My rst test uses di¤erent thresholds for the grade identifying
early versus late tracking countries. The results of these regressions are reported in Tables
6 and 7 for the reading and mathematics test scores respectively. To save space I only
report the results for the specication using all parental background variables in the same
regression.18 For the reading test score this is the equivalent to the specication reported
in column (4) of Table 4. Table 6 shows that the coe¢ cient on the triple interaction term
of family background, early tracking, and the dummy indicating whether the observation
comes from the secondary school (PISA) sample is hardly ever signicantly di¤erent from
zero. The only exception is the specication using grade 4 as the early tracking threshold.
In this case the coe¢ cient on the triple interaction for parental education is marginally
signicant but with a negative coe¢ cient. This would indicate that parental education
becomes less important in early tracking countries after actual tracking has taken place.
The results reported in Table 6 do not support the hypothesis that tracking exacerbates the
importance of family background for studentstest scores.
Table 7 reports the results for the mathematics test score. Using the end of grade 4
as the threshold for early tracking, the coe¢ cients of the triple interactions indicate that
family background becomes more important in early tracking countries between grades 3/4
and grades 7/8. Using any other grade as the threshold to divide the sample into early
versus late tracking countries I nd no evidence that the importance of family background
increases between grades 3/4 and grades 7/8.
As mentioned above, there is more than one way to measure the extent of tracking.
Hanushek &Woessmann and Schuetz et al., for example, use the age at which tracking takes
place as their measure. Ammermueller denes tracking slightly di¤erently by the number of
school tracks that exist during secondary school in a certain country. Table 8 compares the
results from using my tracking measure (grade after which tracking occurs), and the other
two dened in this paragraph. The triple interactions of the family background variable, the
tracking measure, and the dummy indicating whether the observation is from the secondary
grades are mostly not signicantly di¤erent from zero, independent of the tracking measure
used in the estimation. The results presented in column 2 of Table 8 show that the number
of books at home is relatively less important in countries with later tracking ages in grades
9/10 compared to grade 4. This result, however, is only signicant at the 10 percent level.
Speaking the test language seems to be less important in later grades in countries with more
tracks (thus more tracking). Again, this coe¢ cient is only signicant at the 10 percent
level. These two marginally signicant triple interactions propose conicting conclusions
on whether more tracking increases or reduces the importance of family background for
18Using the other specications does not a¤ect the conclusions drawn from this exercise.
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childrens reading test scores. All other coe¢ cients on the triple interaction terms are not
signicantly di¤erent from zero and indicate no e¤ect of tracking after tracking has taken
place.
For the mathematics test score, with results reported in Table 9, none of the coe¢ cients
on the triple interaction terms is signicantly di¤erent from zero. Furthermore, the point
estimate of these coe¢ cients is always close to 0. There is no evidence that tracking inu-
ences the importance of parental background for educational attainment after tracking has
taken place.
Another worry may be that factors varying at the country level and a¤ecting the impor-
tance of the family background are not constant over time, and would thus not be controlled
using the xed e¤ects strategy. Using tests administered in alternative years may address
this problem. Because PISA 2003 and PIRLS 2001 were not carried out in the same year,
there may have been changes in the schooling systems a¤ecting the importance of the fam-
ily background on studentstest scores between 2001 and 2003. Unfortunately there are no
comparable international pupil ability tests testing reading skills of di¤erent cohorts in the
same year. Nonetheless, using the PISA 2000 data instead of the 2003 wave of PISA may be
a suitable way to deal with this problem. This is because changes between 2001 and 2003
will not have had an e¤ect on the PISA 2000 results.
Table 10 reports the results from the same specications as reported in Table 4 but using
PISA 2000 and PIRLS 2001 as the data sources. The coe¢ cients on the triple interactions
show that there is no evidence that the importance of family background increases relatively
more in early tracking countries between grade 4 and grades 9/10.
The DiD results for the mathematics test score presented above were estimated using the
1995 wave of TIMSS, which tested students of both the grades 3/4 and grades 7/8 cohorts.
Nonetheless, these results may be problematic because the factors a¤ecting the importance
of family background for mathematics test scores may have changed in a year shortly before
1995. Students from the two cohorts may have been exposed to this changing environment
at a di¤erent age. I use the 1999 wave of TIMSS which tested students in grades 7 or 8 to
address this potential problem. Table 11 reports the results from this exercise. Note that
the number of countries which can be used for estimation purposes is very small, so any
conclusion drawn from this exercise should be handled with caution.19 Again, the triple
interactions are almost always insignicant. The only exception is the interaction involving
19I use a di¤erent set of student characteristics compared to all other regressions presented in this paper
to estimate the specication reported in Table 11. In all other regressions I was using the same set of student
characteristics: a gender dummy, age, a dummy whether the student was born in the country and dummies
indicating whether the student lives with a singleparent or without parents. If I did include the dummies
indicating the family structure in this estimation the sample would be reduced by about 30 percent and I
would lose 3 out of 8 countries because 3 countries did not report the family structure variables. This a¤ects
the results in a non-random way. Therefore I omit the two dummies indicating whether the student lives
with a singleparent or without parents. Table A3 shows that omitting these 2 variables does not have an
impact on the results obtained from estimating the di¤erence-in-di¤erences results for the original TIMSS
1995 sample as can be seen from comparing the results presented in Table A3 and Table 5. This makes me
condent that omitting these two variables is the preferred option for having a more representative sample.
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the language spoken at home if considered as the only family background variable which is
reported in column 2. In this case, the coe¢ cient indicates that family background becomes
relatively more important in early tracking countries between grades 3/4 and grades 7/8.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
The results obtained from estimating equation (2) show that family background is more
important in early tracking countries. I nd, however, that family background does not
become more important after tracking occurs in the early tracking countries. In the absence
of anticipation e¤ects this is evidence that tracking does not causally a¤ect the importance of
family background for educational attainment. While this result is interesting in itself, it is
even more interesting that at the same time, two other papers nd that tracking exacerbates
educational inequalities using the some of the datasets I use in this paper. One study was
carried out my Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) and one by Ammermueller (2005). I
discuss the likely reasons for obtaining di¤erent results in turn.
Hanushek and Woessmann do not look at the specic e¤ect of family background on test
scores but look at whether tracking increases inequality measured by the within country
standard deviation, the 75th-25th or the 95th-5th percentile di¤erences of test scores. To
address the concern of bias due to unobservables, they employ a similar DiD strategy to
the one in this paper: they look at the change in inequality between a primary school test
score (no tracking in any country) and a test score for secondary school students (after
tracking in some countries). In their main specication they use data on reading from the
same data sources I use for my main specication on reading test scores. In order to assess
the reasons of obtaining di¤erent ndings, I replicate their results and show that these
results are not stable if one considers a di¤erent measure for tracking and a slightly di¤erent
sample. Column (1) of Table 12 reports the second column of their main table (Table 2 in
Hanushek and Woessmann (2006)).20 They regress the within country standard deviation
(appropriately normalized) for secondary school students on an indicator for early tracking.
As a measure for tracking they use a threshold of tracking before the age of 15. To control
for pre-existing levels of inequality they also include the within-country standard deviation
of test scores for primary school students. They conclude that inequality is higher for early
tracking countries based on a positive and signicant coe¢ cient on the early tracking dummy
as reported in the rst column of Table 12. In column (2) of Table 12, I show, however, that
using the same sample but a di¤erent tracking measure (here tracking at the end of grade
5 or before) the results are no longer signicantly di¤erent from 0. Furthermore, using a
sample of OECD countries only, which reduces the sample by only three countries, further
weakens their results. Using small variations in their specication I can, therefore, no longer
20I thank Ludger Woessmann for providing me with details on the way they estimate their results.
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replicate their ndings and obtain results which are in line with the results presented in this
paper. Namely, that tracking does not increase educational inequality.
My results are also slightly di¤erent from the ones obtained by Ammermueller (2005)
even though the identication strategies used are very similar and he uses data from PISA
and PIRLS as well. He nds that the number of books at a students home do not become
more important in tracking systems with more tracks after actual tracking has taken place
which is the same result as I nd. He nds that speaking the test language becomes less
important in countries with more tracks (and thus more tracking). This is similar to the
nding on speaking the test language in this paper. On the other hand, he nds that
students with native parents do better in tracked countries after actual tracking has taken
place. Furthermore, he nds that the importance of parental education increases in countries
with more tracking. Therefore 2 of his 4 results indicate that tracking does not a¤ect or
reduces the importance of family background for studentstest scores. The results on the
other 2 family background variables indicate that tracking exacerbates the importance of
family background.
How can I reconcile this with my ndings? Ammermueller uses a di¤erent denition for
parental education, namely having a parent with a university degree whereas I use a linear
years of education measure. Furthermore, he drops 2 countries (Canada and England)
because not all regions in those countries were sampled. Reestimating my results with this
reduced sample does not change the conclusion from my paper: tracking does not intensify
the role of family background for studentseducation. The factor which probably explains
a big part of the di¤erence between our papers is that I cluster my standard errors at the
country level, while he is clustering the standard errors at the school level. Clustering at
the country level allows for any arbitrary correlation of the error terms of students within
one country. This is the level of clustering which is appropriate in this setting. Clustering
at the school level leads to much smaller standard errors, and thus to signicant coe¢ cients
which may well be insignicant if one clusters at the country level.
My results clearly indicate that the estimates in the existing literature are not stable to
using slightly di¤erent tracking measures, samples, and specications. This further increases
the condence in my nding that tracking does not exacerbate the importance of parental
background for educational test scores. The question remains why tracking does not a¤ect
the importance of family background. As mentioned above, parents have the possibility to
self select according to socioeconomic status even in untracked systems, so one path may
be through residential segregation. This is exemplied by the literature on the e¤ect of
school quality on house prices which mainly uses evidence from the US and the UK - both
untracked countries.21
Another way of improving a childs education even in untracked systems is to enroll
the child in a better and possibly expensive private school. Furthermore, choosing certain
21See Black (1999) and Figlio and Lucas (2004) for careful studies of the e¤ect of school quality on house
prices.
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subjects (e.g. learning ancient languages) may lead to better peers and thus better learning
even in a system which has no o¢ cial tracking policy. Thus even untracked systems give
parents and students opportunities to select into better schools. Further research is needed
to pin down the factors which enable parents to improve their childs education and may
thus create inequalities in opportunity for children from di¤erent backgrounds. Nonetheless,
my ndings could be consistent with the view that tracking has a causal impact on the
importance of family background for childrens test scores if the above mentioned e¤ects of
tracking happened before actual tracking takes place. I use studies which tested students in
grades 3 or 4 as a baseline level of the role of parental background. This is just a short time
before some of the early tracking countries sort students according to ability. Parents may
anticipate the e¤ect of tracking and motivate their children to do better in school already
before tracking takes place. My DiD methodology may fail to pick up these anticipatory
e¤ects of tracking. Given that my results are independent of the tracking threshold I choose
may be an indication that anticipation e¤ects are not very important. Research strategies
which circumvent this problem may shed more light on the debate of the e¤ect of tracking.
I conclude, however, that the cross-country evidence to date, if carried out carefully, does
not suggest that tracking exacerbates the importance of family background for students
test scores.
21
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8 Tables
Table 1: Countries in the di¤erent Estimation Samples
Secondary School Test PISA 2003 PISA 2000 TIMSS 1995 7/82;3 + TIMSS 1999 7/8 +
Primary School Test PIRLS1 PIRLS TIMSS 1995 3/44 TIMSS 1995 3/4
Main Specication Robustness Check Main Specication Robustness Check
Reading Reading Mathematics Mathematics
Australia  
Austria 
Canada    
Czech Republic    
France  
Germany  
Greece   
Hungary   
Iceland   
Ireland 
Italy  
Korea  
Netherlands   
New Zealand    
Norway   
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Sweden  
Turkey 
United Kingdom    
USA  
Number of Countries 14/15 12 11/15 8
 including school quality  without school quality
1The US drops out because the parental background information is missing for all students in PIRLS. 2Also France and Japan
participated in TIMSS. As the information on being born in the country is missing for all observations they are not in my
sample. 3School quality is missing for all observations from Austria, Greece and Norway. 4The information on school quality
for the Netherlands is missing for the Grade 4 wave.
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Table 3: Correlations of Tracking Measures
Tracking Tracking Number of
Grade Age Tracks
Tracking Grade 1
Tracking Age 0.81 1
Number of Tracks in Secondary School -0.75 -0.69 1
Table 4: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences Reading (PIRLS 2001 and PISA 2003)
Dependent Variable: Reading Test Score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Highest Parental Education (years) 6.16 4.68
(0.81)*** (0.62)***
HPE*PISA 0.14 -0.39
(1.05) (0.82)
HPE*Earlytrack 4.78 3.44
(1.27)*** (1.29)**
HPE*Earlytrack*Secondary -1.28 -1.24
(0.73) (1.25)
Number of Books 0.13 0.10
(0.02)*** (0.01)***
NoB*PISA 0.06 0.06
(0.02)** (0.02)**
NoB*Earlytrack 0.05 -0.01
(0.02)** (0.02)
NoB*Earlytrack*Secondary -0.03 0.04
(0.02) (0.03)
Language 38.35 33.51
(4.23)*** (3.76)***
Language*PISA -18.74 -20.98
(6.72)** (7.37)**
Language*Earlytrack 19.02 7.51
(8.22)** (5.37)
Language*Earlytrack*Secondary -10.64 -6.93
(7.73) (11.19)
Female 28.33 25.49 26.44 25.97
(1.27)*** (1.16)*** (1.28)*** (1.33)***
Age of Student 6.71 5.03 3.83 6.89
(3.24)* (3.29) (3.39) (2.90)**
Native Student 26.14 22.09 20.75 17.39
(3.95)*** (4.25)*** (4.78)*** (4.18)***
Living with Singleparent -11.55 -9.50 -14.08 -8.87
(2.44)*** (2.37)*** (2.30)*** (2.19)***
Living without Parents -39.84 -39.27 -46.56 -36.34
(6.98)*** (5.32)*** (5.69)*** (6.11)***
Secondary School Test Dummy X X X X
School Quality X X X X
Country FE X X X X
Number of Countries 14 14 14 14
Observations 116366 118690 124826 113018
R-squared 0.18 0.20 0.14 0.22
Robust standard errors in parenthesis (clustered at the country level)
* signicant at 10% ** signicant at 5% *** signicant at 1%
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Table 5: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences Mathematics
(TIMSS 1995 Grades 3/4 and TIMSS 1995 Grades 7/8)
Dependent Variable: Mathematics Test Score
(1) (2) (3)
Number of Books 0.15 0.14
(0.02)*** (0.02)***
NoB*Secondary 0.05 0.05
(0.01)*** (0.01)***
NoB*Earlytrack 0.07 0.05
(0.02)** (0.02)**
NoB*Earlytrack*Secondary -0.04 -0.01
(0.02)* (0.04)
Language 33.89 30.67
(4.77)*** (4.23)***
Language*Secondary -7.91 -12.00
(7.56) (6.86)
Language*Earlytrack 6.78 3.69
(4.61) (4.84)
Language*Earlytrack*Secondary 0.86 -1.54
(8.50) (5.04)
Female -4.98 -4.81 -5.19
(1.36)*** (1.53)** (1.36)***
Age 14.5 13.51 14.82
(3.56)*** (3.72)*** (3.39)***
Native 7.75 5.69 2.8
(4.96) (5.54) (5.07)
Living with Singleparent -12.31 -16.17 -12.47
(2.01)*** (1.96)*** (1.97)***
Living without Parents -27.61 -31.19 -25.82
(4.66)*** (4.80)*** (4.47)***
Secondary School Test Dummy X X X
School Quality X X X
Country FE X X X
Number of Countries 11 11 11
Observations 102245 96873 95616
R-squared 0.20 0.16 0.21
Robust standard errors in parenthesis (clustered at the country level)
* signicant at 10% ** signicant at 5% *** signicant at 1%
27
Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis 1: Early Tracking Thresholds (Reading)
Dependent Variable: Reading Test Score
Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 8
Highest Parental 4.88 4.68 4.73 5.57
Education (years) (0.61)*** (0.62)*** (0.62)*** (0.48)***
HPE*Secondary -0.40 -0.39 -0.45 -1.34
(0.83) (0.82) (0.80) (0.94)
HPE*Earlytrack 3.33 3.44 2.34 -0.36
(1.74)* (1.29)** (1.15)* (0.76)
HPE*Earlytrack*Secondary -2.07 -1.24 -0.81 0.99
(1.15)* (1.25) (0.99) (0.84)
Number of Books 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.07
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
NoB*Secondary 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.11
(0.02)*** (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.02)***
NoB*Earlytrack -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)**
NoB*Earlytrack*Secondary 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)**
Language 34.30 33.51 34.10 37.15
(3.48)*** (3.76)*** (3.63)*** (6.98)***
Language*Secondary -22.61 -20.98 -22.26 -26.54
(6.99)*** (7.37)** (7.63)** (10.68)**
Language*Earlytrack 7.26 7.51 4.59 -2.36
(6.71) (5.37) (5.92) (7.23)
Language*Earlytrack*Secondary 2.38 -6.93 -2.90 4.23
(7.98) (11.19) (9.04) (12.27)
Secondary School Test Dummy X X X X
Student Characteristics X X X X
School Quality X X X X
Country FE X X X X
Number of Countries 14 14 14 14
Observations 113018 113018 113018 113018
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis 1: Early Tracking Thresholds (Mathematics)
Dependent Variable: Mathematics Test Score
Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 8
Number of Books 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.17
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
NoB*Secondary 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05
(0.01)** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
NoB*Earlytrack 0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02)** (0.03) (0.03)
NoB*Earlytrack*Secondary 0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.01)*** (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Language 31.20 30.67 29.46 34.12
(3.90)*** (4.23)*** (4.45)*** (7.48)***
Language*Secondary -12.85 -12 -12.33 -15.74
(6.68)* (6.86) (7.07) (10.3)
Language*Earlytrack 3.25 3.69 8.56 -5.91
(5.99) (4.84) (5.92) (7.80)
Language*Earlytrack*Secondary 20.15 -1.54 1.33 6.75
(5.90)*** (5.04) (6.15) (7.97)
Secondary School Test Dummy X X X X
Student Characteristics X X X X
School Quality X X X X
Country FE X X X X
Number of Countries 11 11 11 11
Observations 95616 95616 95616 95616
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
Robust standard errors in parenthesis (clustered at the country level)
* signicant at 10% ** signicant at 5% *** signicant at 1%
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Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis 2: Tracking Measures (Reading)
Dependent Variable: Reading Test Score
Grade of Tracking Age of Tracking Number of Tracks
Highest Parental 4.68 9.71 5.25
Education (years) (0.62)*** (2.77)*** (1.26)***
HPE*Secondary -0.39 -2.36 -0.42
(0.82) (2.28) (1.13)
HPE*Tracking Measure (TM) 3.44 -0.28 0.11
(1.29)** (0.17) (0.72)
HPE*TM*Secondary -1.24 0.11 -0.19
(1.25) (0.14) (0.49)
Number of Books 0.10 0.06 0.10
(0.01)*** (0.05) (0.03)***
NoB*Secondary 0.06 0.18 0.02
(0.02)** (0.05)*** (0.04)
NoB*Tracking Measure (TM) -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
NoB*TM*Secondary 0.04 -0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.00)* (0.02)
Language 33.51 37.09 34.91
(3.76)*** (14.38)** (5.83)***
Language*Secondary -20.98 -66.34 -3.12
(7.37)** (31.90)* (10.53)
Language*TM 7.51 -0.17 -0.16
(5.37) (0.88) (3.78)
Language*TM*Secondary -6.93 2.80 -10.38
(11.19) (1.85) (5.45)*
Secondary School Test Dummy X X X
Student Characteristics X X X
School Quality X X X
Country FE X X X
Number of Countries 14 14 14
Observations 113018 113018 113018
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.22
Table 9: Sensitivity Analysis 2: Tracking Measures (Mathematics)
Dependent Variable: Mathematics Test Score
Grade of Tracking Age of Tracking Number of Tracks
Number of Books 0.14 0.28 0.11
(0.02)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)**
NoB*Secondary 0.05 0.04 0.04
(0.01)*** (0.08) (0.04)
NoB*Tracking Measure (TM) 0.05 -0.01 0.03
(0.02)** (0.00)** (0.03)
NoB*TM*Secondary -0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.04) (0.00) (0.03)
Language 30.67 39.81 20.9
(4.23)*** (16.09)** (9.44)*
Language*Secondary -12.00 -7.51 -13.66
(6.86) (22.45) (10.54)
Language*Tracking Measure (TM) 3.69 -0.51 8.56
(4.84) (0.88) (5.92)
Language*TM*Secondary -1.54 -0.26 1.33
(5.04) (1.11) (6.15)
Secondary School Test Dummy X X X
Student Characteristics X X X
School Quality X X X
Country FE X X X
Number of Countries 11 11 11
Observations 95616 95616 95616
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.21
Robust standard errors in parenthesis (clustered at the country level)
* signicant at 10% ** signicant at 5% *** signicant at 1%
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Table 10: Sensitivity Analysis 3: Di¤erent Data
Reading: PISA 2000 and PIRLS 2001
Dependent Variable: Reading Test Score
(1) (3) (4) (5)
Highest Parental 5.99 4.67
Education (years) (0.40)*** (0.35)***
HPE*Secondary 2.52 0.96
(0.76)*** -0.74
HPE*Earlytrack 4.06 1.74
(0.64)*** (0.26)***
HPE*Earlytrack*Secondary 0.13 1.69
(0.56) (1.18)
Number of Books 0.13 0.09
(0.01)*** (0.01)***
NoB*Secondary 0.09 0.08
(0.01)*** (0.02)***
NoB*Earlytrack 0.04 0.01
(0.02)** (0.01)*
NoB*Earlytrack*Secondary -0.03 0.00
(0.02) (0.02)
Language 36.35 29.93
(3.05)*** (3.37)***
Language*Secondary 6.17 -2.23
(5.29) (5.15)
Language*Earlytrack 14.11 11.67
(11.25) (7.18)
Language*Earlytrack*Secondary -7.72 -28.73
(5.87) (14.49)*
Secondary School Test Dummy X X X X
Student Characteristics X X X X
School Quality X X X X
Country FE X X X X
Number of Countries 12 12 12 12
Observations 73108 76323 82500 71242
R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.12 0.23
Robust standard errors in parenthesis (clustered at the country level)
* signicant at 10% ** signicant at 5% *** signicant at 1%
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Table 11: Sensitivity Analysis 3: Di¤erent Data
Mathematics (TIMSS 1995 3/4 and TIMSS 1999 7/8)
Dependent Variable: Mathematics Test Score
(1) (2) (3)
Number of Books 0.16 0.15
(0.02)*** (0.02)***
NoB*Secondary 0.05 0.06
(0.01)*** (0.01)***
NoB*Earlytrack 0.06 0.05
(0.03) (0.02)**
NoB*Earlytrack*Secondary 0.01 0.03
(0.02) (0.03)
Language 35.22 30.90
(4.28)*** (3.71)***
Language*Secondary -14.90 -17.40
(10.77) (9.74)
Language*Earlytrack 4.55 5.24
(5.58) (6.80)
Language*Earlytrack*Secondary 20.44 6.22
(6.41)** (5.14)
Secondary School Test Dummy X X X
Student Characteristics X X X
School Quality X X X
Country Dummies X X X
Number of Countries 8 8 8
Observations 60228 56436 55756
R-squared 0.19 0.15 0.21
Robust standard errors in parenthesis (clustered at the country level)
* signicant at 10% ** signicant at 5% *** signicant at 1%
Table 12: Robustness of Hanushek and Woessmann Results
Dependent Variable: Country-Level Standard Deviation of Reading Test Score
(1)1 (2) (3)
Early Tracking Measure Age of Tracking Grade 5 or before Grade 5 or before
Sample Full Sample Full Sample OECD
Early Tracking 0.25 0.17 0.12
(0.11)** (0.14) (0.16)
Inequality in Primary School 0.59 0.48 0.40
(0.13)*** (0.16)*** (0.20)**
Number of Countries 18 18 15
R-squared 0.48 0.38 0.26
* signicant at 10% ** signicant at 5% *** signicant at 1%
1Column (1) is the same as column (1) of Table 2 in Hanushek and Woessmann (2006)
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9 Appendix
Table A1: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences Reading (PISA 2003 and PIRLS 2001)
Without School Quality
Dependent Variable: Reading Test Score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Highest Parental 6.27 4.66
Education (years) (0.69)*** (0.52)***
HPE*PISA 0.01 -0.50
(1.08) (0.80)
HPE*Earlytrack 4.99 3.67
(1.31)*** (1.04)***
HPE*Earlytrack*PISA -1.25 -1.27
(0.67)* (1.08)
Number of Books 0.14 0.10
(0.02)*** (0.01)***
NoB*PISA 0.06 0.06
(0.02)*** (0.02)***
NoB*Earlytrack 0.05 -0.01
(0.02)** (0.02)
NoB*Earlytrack*PISA -0.03 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
Language 35.58 31.07
(3.83)*** (3.26)***
Language*PISA -10.98 -14.58
(7.49) (7.89)*
Language*Earlytrack 20.35 9.59
(8.49)** (3.85)**
Language*Earlytrack*PISA -12.06 -7.86
(8.25) (13.54)
Secondary School Test Dummy X X X X
Student Characteristics X X X X
School Quality
Country FE X X X X
Number of Countries 15 15 15 15
Observations 146631 150348 158682 143957
R-squared 0.18 0.20 0.14 0.19
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Table A2: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences Mathematics (No School Quality)
TIMSS 1995 (Grades 3/4) and TIMSS 1995 (Grades 7/8)
Without School Quality
Dependent Variable: Mathematics Test Score
(1) (2) (3)
Number of Books 0.15 0.13
(0.01)*** (0.01)***
NoB*Secondary 0.05 0.06
(0.01)*** (0.01)***
NoB*Earlytrack 0.05 0.06
(0.02)** (0.02)***
NoB*Earlytrack*Secondary 0.00 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Language 35.74 31.96
(2.69)*** (2.54)***
Language*Secondary -7.75 -11.71
(5.61) (5.09)**
Language*Earlytrack 17.26 11.74
(5.60)*** (4.58)**
Language*Earlytrack*Secondary 11.38 9.97
(6.51) (4.76)*
Student Characteristics X X X
School Quality
Country FE X X X
Number of Countries 15 15 15
Observations 210224 189915 185947
R-squared 0.18 0.15 0.19
Robust standard errors in parenthesis (clustered at the country level)
* signicant at 10% ** signicant at 5% *** signicant at 1%
Table A3: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences Mathematics
TIMSS 1995 (Grades 3/4) and TIMSS 1995 (Grades 7/8)
Omitting the Dummies for Family Structure
Dependent Variable: Mathematics Test Score
(1) (2) (3)
Number of Books 0.15 0.14
(0.02)*** (0.02)***
NoB*Secondary 0.05 0.05
(0.01)*** (0.01)***
NoB*Earlytracking 0.07 0.05
(0.02)** (0.02)**
NoB*Earlytracking*Secondary -0.04 -0.02
(0.02)* (0.04)
Language 34.60 31.17
(4.89)*** (4.33)***
Language*Secondary -8.10 -12.30
(7.61) (6.90)
Language*Earlytrack 7.03 3.94
(4.71) (4.90)
Language*Earlytrack*Secondary 0.34 -1.55
(8.54) (5.06)
Student Characteristics X X X
School Quality X X X
Country FE X X X
Number of Countries 11 11 11
Observations 102522 97310 95864
R-squared 0.20 0.16 0.20
Robust standard errors in parenthesis (clustered at the country level)
* signicant at 10% ** signicant at 5% *** signicant at 1%
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